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Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A Meta-Analysis 
Blair T. Johnson and Alice H. Eagly 
Purdue University 
Defines involvement as a motivational state induced by an association between an activated attitude 
and the self-concept. Integration ofthe available research su~ests hat he effects of involvement on 
attitude change depended on the aspect of message recipients' elf-concept that was activated to 
create involvement: (a) their enduring values (value-relevant i volvement), (b) their ability to attain 
desirable outcomes (outcome-relevant involvement), or (e) the impression they make on others (im- 
pression-relevant i volvement). Findings howed that (a) with value-relevant i volvement, high-in- 
volvement subjects were less persuaded than low-involvement subjects; (b) with outcome-relevant 
involvement, high-involvement subjects were more persuaded than low-involvement subjects by 
strong arguments and (somewhat inconsistently) less persuaded by weak arguments; and (c) with 
impression-relevant involvement, high-involvement subjects were slightly less persuaded than low- 
involvement subjects. 
To understand the conditions under which people are per- 
suaded by others, researchers have often invoked the concept of 
involvement. Although this construct was popular prior to M. 
Sherifand Cantril's (1947) work (see A. G. Greenwald's, 1982, 
review), their proposal that highly involving attitudes be re- 
garded as components of the self-concept orego was seminal to 
theory about involvement's impact on attitude change. Accord- 
ing to M. Sherif and Cantril (1947), such attitudes "have the 
characteristic of belonging to me, as being part of me, as psycho- 
logically experienced" (p. 93). 
M. Sherif, C. W. Sherif, and their colleagues developed the 
implications of involvement (which they often called "ego in- 
volvement") for persuasion by giving it a major role in their 
social judgment-involvement approach, a theory of attitude 
change developed in the 1950s and early 1960s (Hovland, Har- 
vey, & Sherif, 1957; C. W. Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; M. 
Sherif & Hovland, 1961). During this same period, Zimbardo 
(1960) introduced the concept of response involvement in order 
to predict attitude change in a social influence setting. In more 
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recent years, researchers concerned with the cognitive processes 
underlying attitude change have invoked involvement as a moti- 
vational variable that is presumed to affect persuasion because 
it instigates more thorough processing of persuasive messages 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b, 198 la). In this arti- 
cle, we contend that across these three traditions of research, 
the operational definitions of involvement have differed suffi- 
ciently to require that three types of involvement be distin- 
guished at a conceptual level. As we demonstrate via a recta- 
analytic review of the relevant studies, these three types of in- 
volvement have distinctively different effects on persuasion. 
Value-Relevant Involvement 
From an early point (e.g., M. Sherif & Cantril, 1947), social 
judgment-involvement theorists regarded highly involving atti- 
tudes as components of the ego or self-concept, that is, as as- 
pects of the "self-picturemintimately f lt and eherisbed" (C. W. 
Sherif et al., 1965, p. vi). Among the various attitude theorists 
who followed the Sherifs and their associates by defining in- 
volvement in terms of the embeddedness of highly involving 
attitudes in the self-structure, Ostrom and Brock (1968) pro- 
vided an especially clear statement when they proposed that 
the basic feature of an ego-involved attitude is its relation to the 
manner in which the individual defines himself. The individual de- 
fines himself primarily in terms of that "distinct constellation of 
social and personal values" he has acquired. The closer the relation 
between his attitude and these values and the more central these 
related values are, the higher the degree of attitudinal involvement. 
(p. 375) 
Following Ostrom and Brock, we propose the term value-rele- 
vant involvement to refer to the psychological state that is cre- 
ated by the activation of attitudes that are linked to important 
values. Values are presumed to be aspects of the self that are 
especially important and enduring, consistent with Rokeach's 
(1968) definition of value as people's evaluations of general 
"modes of conduct and end-states ofexistence" (p. 159). 
To develop specific predictions concerning the effects of 
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value-relevant i volvement (along with other variables) on atti- 
tude change, social judgment-involvement theorists proposed 
that an attitude provides an internal frame of reference for judg- 
ing and reacting to stimuli related to the attitude (C:W. Sherif 
et al., 1965; M. Sherif & Hovland, 1961; M. Sherif & Sherif, 
1967). In this tradition, the attitudinal continuum is divided 
into three ranges or latitudes: (a) the latitude of acceptance, con- 
taining a person's own stand and the other positions that he or 
she finds acceptable; (b) the latitude of rejection, containing the 
positions that are objectionable; and (c) the latitude of noncom- 
mitment, containing the positions that are neither acceptable 
nor unacceptable. The widths and locations of these latitudes 
then determine the persuasiveness of messages. Thus, for mes- 
sages advocating positions located within message recipients' 
latitudes of acceptance, successful persuasion is likely to occur. 
For messages advocating positions located beyond the latitude 
of acceptance, persuasion becomes increasingly less likely the 
more discrepant these messages are from recipients' own stand, 
with very little persuasion produced by messages advocating 
positions located in the latitude of rejection. 
Social judgment-involvement theorists assumed that value- 
relevant involvement affects persuasion via its influence on the 
widths of the latitudes. High involvement was represented on 
the attitudinal continuum by a relatively wide latitude of rejec- 
tion and little or no latitude of noncommitment. In contrast, 
low involvement was assumed to produce a narrower latitude 
of rejection and a broader latitude of noncommitment (C. W. 
Sherifct al., 1965). The theory thus suggested that, to the extent 
that recipients are highly involved in the issue discussed in a 
counterattitudinal message, the position the message advocates 
is likely to fall in their latitude of rejection because this latitude 
covers arelatively great range of the attitudinal continuum. The 
prediction that less persuasion is produced by involving than 
by noninvolving messages i  consistent with this reasoning 
about he latitude of rejection. 
Researchers working in this theoretical tradition gave in- 
volvement a variety of operational definitions. In some studies 
(e.g., M. Sherif& Hovland, 1961), involved subjects were mem- 
bers of groups actively supporting a particular stand on an issue, 
and less-involved subjects were not members of such groups. 
Because group members' attitudinal positions usually differed 
from those of nonmembers, researchers sought operational 
definitions of involvement that were not so vulnerable to this 
confound. Identifying high- and low-involvement subjects by 
the relative widths of their latitudes then became popular (e.g., 
Letchworth, 1969; Sereno, 1968). Other operational definitions 
of value-relevant involvement also saw some use, in particular 
(a) the classification of subjects by their self-reports of the im- 
portance or level of involvement of issues (e.g., Powell, 1977) 
and (b) the presentation of messages on issues known to differ 
in level of involvement (e.g., C. W. Sherif, Kelly, Rodgers, 
Sarup, & Tittler, 1973)J 
Despite this multiplicity of operational definitions, highly in- 
volving attitudes were consistently viewed as more difficult to 
change than less-involving attitudes. Nonetheless, for experi- 
ments that crossed involvement with other variables (e.g., the 
size of the discrepancy between subjects' own position and the 
position advocated in the message), investigators produced 
more detailed predictions (e.g., that differences in the persua- 
siveness of more- and less-involving messages would increase as 
message discrepancy increased; see Gorn, 1975; Rhine & Sever- 
ante, 1970). Yet such predictions did not ordinarily include re- 
versals of the tendency for value-relevant involvement to de- 
crease attitude change but instead merely delineated conditions 
in which this tendency would be especially strong. 
Impression-Relevant Involvement 
The opposite prediction about involvement's effects was gen- 
erated by Zimbardo (1960)within a cognitive dissonance 
framework. Following Festinger's (1957) claim that the magni- 
tude of the dissonance created by the juxtaposition of inconsis- 
tent cognitive lements increases with the importance of the 
dements, Zimbardo argued that involvement should facilitate 
attitude change, provided that other methods of reducing disso- 
nance are unavailable. However, as researchers efined disso- 
nance theory by adding a number of conditions that must be 
present for the theory to predict attitude change, the link be- 
tween Zimbardo's prediction and dissonance theory was sev- 
ered because these special conditions were absent in Zim- 
bardo's experiment. For example, Brehm and Cohen (1962) 
proposed that commitment was one of these conditions: People 
must commit hemselves to a discrepant attitudinal position in 
order for dissonance to be created. In subsequent years, a vari- 
ety of other conditions were also proposed (e.g., production of 
unwanted consequences from committing oneself to the attitu- 
dinal position; see Cooper & Fazio, 1984). Although the effects 
of involvement within experimental paradigms that genuinely 
produce dissonance (e.g., counterattitudinal advocacy) are of 
interest, in this article we confine our attention to studies in 
which subjects responded to a communicator's persuasive mes- 
sage and are not presumed to have experienced cognitive disso- 
nance. 
Despite the fact that Zimbardo's (1960) experiment became 
uninterpretable in terms of dissonance theory, the study is well 
known because other investigators designed involvement ma- 
nipulations imilar to Zimbardo's and often adopted Zim- 
bardo's label of response involvement for this independent vari- 
able. These manipulations stressed the self-presentational con- 
sequences of the attitude that subjects anticipated they would 
t Although manipulations of commitment (see Kiesier, 1971) have 
sometimes been regarded as similar to value-relevant i volvement (e.g., 
by Leippe & Elkin, 1987), close inspection of those relatively few com- 
mitment studies that presented subjects with counterattitudinal persua- 
sive messages suggested that these manipulations were dissimilar to 
those we have regarded as instances of value-relevant i volvement. 
These commitment manipulations, which were administered prior to 
the persuasive message, generally made subjects' premessnge positions 
public, for example, by promising that a statement of their position 
would be published in the campus newspaper (e.g., Pallak, Mueller, Dol- 
lar, & Pallak, 1972, Experiment 2) or by obtaining subjects' ignatures 
on a proattitudinal petition (e.g., Kiesler, 1971, pp. 74-85). Another 
manipulation led subjects to expect future interaction with the source 
of the persuasive message but did not lead them to believe that they 
would discuss the issue considered inthis message (Pallak et al., 1972, 
Experiment l). Thus, it is not at all clear that he commitment manipu- 
lations used in persuasion studies influenced the extent o which the 
persuasive message activated subjects' values. 
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express after they received acommunicator's viewpoint. Thus, 
Zimbardo's experimenter told subjects that heir attitudinal po- 
sition would reveal a great deal (high response involvement) or 
nothing (low response involvement) about hemselves. Subjects 
made their position known at~er being exposed to a friend's po- 
sition, which consisted of only a mark on an attitude scale. Al- 
though Zimbardo's experiment followed the tradition of con- 
formity studies by presenting only the communicator's position 
on an issue, involvement manipulations modeled after Zim- 
bardo's were subsequently used in persuasion studies, which 
presented subjects with complex messages consisting of an ad- 
vocated position and supportive argumentation. For example, 
in studies by Chaiken (1980) and Leippe and Elkin (1987), 
high-involvement message recipients were informed that they 
would later be interviewed on and discuss the issue considered 
in the message. 
7~imbardo's (1960) conceptual definition of response in- 
volvement as "the individual's concern with the consequences 
of his response or with the instrumental meaning of his opin- 
ion" (p. 87) was much broader than his operational definition, 
which mainly emphasized one particular consequence: the im- 
pression one makes on others. Because the Zimbardo manipu- 
lation and other manipulations that have been called response 
involvement probably make salient o subjects the self-presen- 
tational consequences of their postmessage positions, we sug- 
gest hat Zimbardo's response involvement label is something 
of a misnomer. We propose instead that the more informative 
term impression-relevant involvement be used to refer to manip- 
ulations of this particular class. 2
In agreement with Leippe and Elkin (1987), we assert hat 
manipulations ofthis type establish aconcern with holding an 
opinion that is socially acceptable to potential evaluators. As 
has been suggested by research on the effects of anticipated au- 
diences on opinions (e.g., Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & Evenbeck, 
1973; Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976; Cial- 
dini & Petty, 1981), message recipients who anticipate public 
scrutiny of their views tend to advocate a flexible, moderate 
position on an issue, when the anticipated audience is not 
known to prefer a polarized position on the issue and the issue 
does not arouse other types of involvement. As Leippe and 
Elkin (1987)'reasoned, such recipients may be attentive to the 
details of a persuasive message in order to become knowledge- 
able enough to win others' approval. However, they may hesitate 
to be greatly influenced, even by strong, cogent arguments, or
to fully reject appeals based on weak, specious arguments, be- 
cause of the self-presentational advantages of maintaining a 
flexible and nonpolarized position. 
Outcome-Relevant I volvement 
In recent years, cognitively oriented persuasion researchers 
have argued that involvement increases message r cipients' mo- 
tivation to process information about he issue discussed in a 
message. Petty and Cacioppo (1979a, 1979b) first provided this 
interpretation a d suggested the term issue involvement for this 
type of involvement. They argued that issue involvement con- 
cerned "the extent o which the attitudinal issue under consid- 
eration is of personal importance" (Petty & Caeioppo, 1979b, 
p. 1915). Moreover, they regarded this type of involvement as 
the same construct that had been examined by social judg- 
ment-involvement researchers (e.g., C. W. Sherifet al., 1965), 
although they distinguished it from Zimbardo's (1960) re- 
sponse involvement. We contend that, on the contrary, the oper- 
ational definitions of involvement used by Petty and Cacioppo 
(e.g., 1979b, 1984) and investigators who have followed their 
example (e.g., Burnkrant & Howard, 1984) are suttieienfly 
different from those used by social judgment-involvement r - 
searchers to justify a different involvement construct, which we 
label outcome-relevant i volvement. We further suggest that, 
like the term response involvement, the term issue involvement 
is something of a misnomer because it implies a considerably 
broader set of operations than have in fact been used by investi- 
gators who invoke the term. 3 
Petty and Cacioppo (1979b) manipulated involvement in 
their first experiment by having the communicator of the high- 
involvement message advocate a policy ehar~ (that coeduca- 
tional visitation hours in university dormitories be changed) for 
the college-student subjects' own university and by having the 
communicator f the low-involvement message advocate the 
change for another, elatively unknown college. In a second ex- 
periment, Petty and Caeioppo (1979b; see also Petty & Caci- 
oppo, 1979a) had their high-involvement communicator advo- 
cate a different policy change (that undergraduate comprehen- 
sive examinations be instituted) for students at the subjects' 
own university versus a distant, relatively unknown university. 
Although this method of manipulating involvement was mod- 
eled on one used much earlier by Apsler and Sears (1968), the 
recent popularity of the manipulation appears to have stemmed 
from its repeated use by Petty, Cacioppo, and their colleagues 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a, 1979b, 1981b, 1984; Petty, Caci- 
oppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo, & Heesacker, 1981). 
In these studies, involvement was manipulated by having a rec- 
ommended change take effect at the subjects' own university 
versus a distant university and by having the recommended 
change take effect soon (next year) versus in the distant future 
(in 10 years). Other investigators have followed this model quite 
closely (e.g., Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; Burnkrant & 
Howard, 1984; Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Schul & Knapp, 1984; 
Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, & Hewitt, 1988). 
We suggest that he term outcome-relevant involvement be ap- 
plied to these manipulations because they make salient o mes- 
sage recipients the relevance of an issue to their currently im- 
portant goals or outcomes. For example, visitation hours im- 
2 Making subjects believe that heir premessage position has impor- 
tant short-term consequences ( .g., Freedman, 1964) has occasionally 
been interpreted asresponse involvement (e.g., by Petty & Caeioppo, 
1986a, p. 89). Such a manipulation does not follow the model of Zim- 
bardo's (1960) experiment and in fact has more in common with ma- 
nipulations ofcommitment (see Footnote 1) than with those Of involve- 
ment. An additional reason that the Freedman (1964) study was not 
included in the meta-analysis was that its persuasive message consisted 
of a mere statement of a position on an issue, unaccompanied by argu- 
mentation. 
3 The term personal relevance, which has recently been substituted 
for issue involvement by some researchers working in the cognitive r - 
sponse/elaboration likelihood tradition (e.g., Petty & Caeioppo, 1986a), 
entails the same difficulties of excessive breadth inrelation to the opera- 
tions used to define it. 
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pinge on college students' ocial lives and on their ability to 
balance academic and social pursuits, and comprehensive ex- 
aminations impinge on students' ability to obtain a degree and 
on the quality of the education they receive. Although proposed 
changes on such issues would affect outcomes that are very im- 
portant o students (provided, of course, that these changes 
would take effect relatively soon at the students' own univer- 
sity), the issues themselves are likely to be relatively unfamiliar 
to students and are unlikely to be closely linked to important 
values, in the manner that major social issues (e.g., abortion, 
arms control, pollution control) are linked to values. Instead, 
when the manipulation links the issues to anticipated outcomes, 
these issues raise strategic considerations in relation to message 
recipients' ability to achieve these outcomes. After the conten- 
tion of James (1890) and Allport (1943) that "fighter for ends" 
is one facet of the self, one can view the goal-oriented respond- 
ing elicited by this type of manipulation as stemming from the 
linkage of subjects' attitudinal position to the purposive aspects 
of the self. 
Given these characteristics of manipulations ofoutcome-rel- 
evant involvement, i  is not surprising that investigators argued 
that involvement increases message recipients' motivation to 
engage in message-relevant thinking (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979b). Motivation to process is crucial from the 
standpoint of the cognitive r sponse approach to understanding 
persuasion (e.g., A. G. Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & 
Brock, 1981), the framework that provides the rationale for 
many of the predictions about he effects of outcome-relevant 
involvement. This approach (as well as the subsequent elabora- 
tion likelihood model; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b) re- 
gards persuasion as mediated by the quantity and valence of 
message r cipients' thoughts (i.e., cognitive responses) relevant 
to the issue or message. Thus, for messages that elicit unfavor- 
able thinkin& increased message-relevant thinking should de- 
crease persuasion, whereas for messages that elicit favorable 
thinking, this increased processing should increase persuasion. 
If involvement motivates people to engage in more message- 
relevant thinking, it should decrease persuasion for messages 
that elicit predominantly unfavorable thoughts and increase 
persuasion for messages that elicit predominantly favorable 
thoughts. 
Given this rationale provided by cognitive response theory, 
predictions can be made about he effects of outcome-relevant 
involvement only if the valence of message r cipients' thoughts 
is known. Earlier research by Petty, Wells, and Brock (1976) 
established that messages containing weak, specious arguments 
elicit primarily unfavorable thoughts and that messages con- 
taining strong, compelling arguments elicit predominantly fa- 
vorable thoughts. Crossing level of outcome-relevant involve- 
ment and argument strength in a factorial design, Petty and 
Cacioppo (1979b, Experiment 2) then showed that when a 
counterattitudinal message contained weak, specious argu- 
ments, involvement enhanced the production of unfavorable 
thoughts and inhibited persuasion and when the message con- 
tained strong, compelling arguments, involvement enhanced 
the production of favorable thoughts and facilitated persuasion. 
Because Petty and Cacioppo (1979b) linked their findings to 
those of the social judgment-involvement xperiments, these 
results could be taken to imply that weakness of argnmentation 
explained why involvement had inhibited attitude change in 
this earlier work. Yet it seems unlikely that researchers would 
commonly have written persuasive communications to include 
predominantly weak, specious arguments. We think that the 
difference in findings instead stems from a major difference in 
the way issues were made involving in these two traditions of 
research: In social judgment-involvement xperiments, ub- 
jects' involvement with the issue stemmed from the link be- 
tween the issue and ingrained values, whereas in cognitive re- 
sponse xperiments, he importance of the issue stemmed from 
its link to outcomes that subjects hoped to attain relatively soon. 
Although Petty and Cacioppo (1986a) stated that the involve- 
ment effects they predict might not occur "where personal in- 
terests are so intense, as when an issue is intimately associated 
with central values" (p. 87), we suggest that.value-relevant in- 
volvement is not reducible to an extremely high level of out- 
come-relevant i volvement but is instead aqualitatively differ- 
ent type of involvement that has persuasive effects distinct from 
those of outcome-relevant involvement. 
Three Forms of Self-Relevance 
That involvement has been studied in such different ways in 
the social influence settings of persuasion research should not 
be surprising in view of the varied uses of the self in social psy- 
chology (see A. G. Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). Although 
M. Sherif and Cantril's (1947) forniulation of involvement was 
aptly focused on the self-concept, their discussion did not antic- 
ipate that the involvement construct would be used in such dis- 
parate ways in subsequent research on attitude change. Yet, 
consistent with their discussion, a general definition of involve- 
ment encompassing these varied uses of the term appropriately 
focuses on the self. We thus propose that involvement is the 
motivational state induced by an association between an acti- 
vated attitude and some aspect of the self-concept. For value- 
relevant involvement, the pertinent aspect of the self is one's 
enduring values: The persuasive message activates an attitude 
that was linked to one's values prior to the experiment or that 
became linked during the experiment. For impression-relevant 
involvement, the pertinent aspect of the self is the public self or 
the impression one makes on others: The issue on which one 
expects to express an attitude after receiving apersuasive mes- 
sage is linked to the public self by the anticipation that this atti- 
tude will be known to an evaluative audience. For outcome-rele- 
vant involvement, the pertinent aspect of the self is one's ability 
to attain desirable outcomes: The information that the persua- 
sive message provides and the attitude one forms on the basis of 
this information are made to appear relevant to the attainment 
of these outcomes. In its broadest interpretation, outcome-rele- 
vant involvement could be viewed as encompassing the other 
two types because both maintaining one's values and making a 
favorable impression on others are desirable outcomes. None- 
theless, because of the three distinct raditions of experimenta- 
tion on involvement's effects on persuasion, we prefer to view 
outcomes more narrowly: An outcome is an explicit personal 
goal that one expects to obtain relatively soon mainly by one's 
own efforts and that directs aspects of one's behavior. 
The communality of the three types of involvement is their 
activation of the self-concept. Their considerable differences lie 
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in the particular aspect of the self that is aroused. These differ- 
ences are so important for predicting the persuasiveness of com- 
munications that it is perhaps unfortunate that the term in- 
volvement has been used for all three types. Nonetheless, to 
maintain continuity with traditional terminology, we favor con- 
tinued use of the term involvement, but with the appropriate 
descriptor--value r levant, impression relevant, or outcome 
relevant--added when specific findings are discussed. 
Design of Meta-Analysis 
Setting boundaries for research on involvement and persua- 
sion. To examine the effects of the three types of involvement, 
we endeavored to locate all studies that had manipulated or as- 
sessed message recipients' involvement and related this inde- 
pendent variable to the persuasion induced by a communica- 
tion. The boundaries of this research literature are not clear- 
cut because some operational definitions of involvement were 
seriously confounded with other independent variables, other 
operationalizations that seemed unambiguous instances of one 
of our involvement types had not been labeled involvement by 
the author or authors of the study, and a few that were labeled 
involvement seemed unrelated to any of our three types. 
We decided to exclude studies with obviously confounded 
manipulations. 4 This decision meant hat the early work of the 
Sherifs and their colleagues was not included (e.g,, Hovland et 
al., 1957; C. W. Sherifet al., 1965; M. Sherif & Hovland, 1961) 
because these investigators compared groups differing in their 
initial stands on issues and then merely discussed the resulting 
findings in terms of involvement differences that they suggested 
were correlated with these stands. In addition, we decided to 
include studies with operational definitions that were suitable 
exemplars of involvement inall respects other than the fact that 
this variable was not labeled involvement (e.g., personal rele- 
vance in  Sorrentino et al., 1988). Finally, because manipula- 
tions of involvement that did not fit into any of our three types 
seemed not to activate the self-concept, we excluded these stud- 
ies as inconsistent with the usual understanding of involvement 
in social psychology. For example, in a condition labeled high 
involvement, Tsal (1985) instructed subjects to form an attitude 
toward the brand depicted in an advertising message (and he 
omitted this attitude-formation instruction in a condition la- 
beled low involvement). 5 
The recta-analysis is also limited to studies in which message 
recipients were exposed to communications consisting of a po- 
sition advocated by a communicator and one or more argu- 
•ments  designed to support the position. Studies were excluded if
the message consisted of a mere statement of a communicator's 
position, without any support or argumentation, as is typical in 
conformity studies. One reason that our domain was limited in 
this way is that the theories underlying the recent interest in 
involvement research (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b) 
have been tailored to account for the persuasion that occurs 
when people are exposed to relatively complex messages. In ad- 
dition, this limitation had the advantage of confining the meta- 
analysis to studies that are somewhat homogeneous method- 
ologically and that therefore can be more readily compared. 
Partitioning studies on message strength. In involvement 
studies, as in other research in experimental social psychology, 
the variable of interest (involvement) has often been crossed 
with other variables (e.g., communicator c edibility) in facto- 
rial designs. The meta-analyst can represent the effect of such a 
variable aggregated over these other variables (i.e., as a main 
effect). Alternatively, the meta-analyst can partition each study 
on each of these other variables and represent the effect of inter- 
est within levels of the other variables (i.e., as a simple main 
effect). The relative merits of these strategies depends on two 
considerations: (a)Have any of these other variables (e.g., com- 
municator credibility) been crossed with the focal variable (i.e., 
involvement) frequently enough so that a fairly large subset of 
the studies can be similarly partitioned, and (b) are the other 
variables (e.g., communicator c edibility) associated with rever- 
sals of the effects of the focal variable (i.e., involvement in- 
creases persuasion at one level but decreases it at another level)? 
In the sample of studies, we found only one variable that was 
very commonly crossed with involvement in factorial designs: 
the strength of the persuasive message. This variable was typi- 
cally manipulated by supporting the position advocated in the 
message with arguments preselected to be either quite weak or 
quite strong (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b). Less commonly, 
the strength of the message was manipulated by presenting sub- 
jects with a smaller or larger number of arguments (e.g., 
Chaiken, 1980). 6 As was explained earlier, the impact of out- 
4 By obviously confounded manipulations, we mean confounds that 
were unambiguously established by the authors' own report of their 
data (e.g., the Hovland et al., 1957, confounding of involvement and 
subjects' initial attitudinal positions). In addition, we considered as ob- 
viously confounded those involvement manipulations that consisted of 
two or more separate procedures, one of which is ordinarily considered 
to manipulate another construct. For example, Gardner, Mitchell, and 
Russo (1978) told high-involvement subjects to examine advertise- 
ments "as though they were planning a purchase of the product class of 
the brand in the advertisement" and told low-involvement subjects to 
evaluate the advertisements on"the amount of otomotopia[sic], asso- 
nance, alliteration, rhyme, hyperbole in the copy and the number of 
times the words 'you' and 'your' appeared" (p. 585). The latter aspect 
of this involvement manipulation would ordinarily be considered a ma- 
nipulation of distraction, a different construct. Confounds certainly 
may have occurred under other circumstances, pecially when involve- 
ment was varied by classifying subjects according to their own responses 
(e.g., Powell, 1977) or was manipulated by presenting high- and low- 
involvement subjects with messages on different issues (e.g., Rhine & 
Severance, 1970). However, lacking proof from data or from separate 
operations, we cannot be certain that involvement was confounded with 
other variables in such designs, and these studies were retained in our 
sample. 
s Tsal's (1985) manipulation finvolvement reflects the typical con- 
ceptualization f the variable in the consumer-behavior l terature, in 
which information processing has been emphasized instead of an asso- 
ciation between the attitude and the self, which has been central in social 
psychology. Integrating typical definitions of involvement by consumer 
psychologists, A. G. Greenwald and Leavitt (1984) defined the concept 
as "the allocation of attentional capacity to a message, as needed to 
analyze the message at one of a series of increasingly abstract levels" 
(p. 591). Consistent with this definition, consumer psychologists have 
manipulated involvement via a diverse set of treatments designed to 
influence information processing. 
6 A larger number of argnments would increase m ~  strength only 
if the quality of these arguments was relatively high. A larger number of 
low-quality arguments would decrease message strength. The effects of 
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come-relevant i volvement on persuasion shouM be positive for 
strong messages and negative for weak messages. Thus, because 
of the popularity of crossing involvement with message strength 
and because of the reversals associated with this manipulation, 
studies were (whenever possible) partitioned on message 
strength (i.e., the quality or number of arguments), and involve- 
ment's effect was examined separately within weak and strong 
messages (as well as aggregated over message strength). 
Aside from message strength, studies were not partitioned 
with respect to other variables (e.g., communicator credibility, 
message discrepancy, audience nthusiasm). Admittedly, these 
other variables have some importance in the theories of persua- 
sion that spawned the research we review. For example, com- 
municator variables can serve as peripheral cues in the elabora- 
tion likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) and as a deter: 
minant of latitude width in the social judgment-involvement 
framework (C. W. Sherif et al., 1965). Nonetheless, each such 
variable was manipulated in such a small number of studies 
that there would be little or no gain from quantifying the effects 
of these variables. Moreover, these variables were not typically 
presumed to create reversals ofinvolvement's effects. However, 
a few of these other variables established, for one level of the 
variable, a situation so atypical of persuasion research that the 
atypical condition was deleted from the meta-analy~is. For ex- 
ample, Petty and Cacioppo (1979b, Experiment 1) presented 
half of the subjects with a proattitudinal communication (i.e., 
one that matched their premessage attitudes) and the other half 
with a counterattitudinal communication. Because the mes- 
sages used in persuasion studies tend to be counterattitudinal 
(so that change toward the message can be assessed), the proatti- 
tudinal condition of this study was removed. Similarly, other 
studies established, for half of their subjects, an atypical set for 
receiving the message or responding tothe attitudinal measure. 
For example, Apsler and Sears (1968) warned half of their sub- 
jects of the position the communicator was going to take, and 
Schul and Knapp (1984) presented the attitude measure to half 
of their subjects in a bogus pipeline format (see Jones & Sigall, 
1971). Conditions establishing such unusual sets were also de- 
leted. 
Method 
Sample of Studies 
Computer-based information searches were conducted using the key- 
word involvement o  he following data bases: Psychological Abstracts 
(PsycINFO: 1967 to July 1987); acompilation of newly published psy- 
chological research (PsycALERT. July 1987); Dissertation Abstracts In- 
ternational (DAI: 1861 to July 1987); Educational Resources Informa- 
tion Center (ERIC: 1966 to December 1985); and a worldwide business 
and management data base (Am/INFORM: 1971 tO December 1985). 
The Social SciSearch data base was also searched tolocate articles that 
cited Petty and Cacioppo (1979b) as of December 1985. We also 
searched through (a) the reference lists of numerous review articles, 
books, and chapters of books; (b) the reference lists of all located studies; 
the number ofargnments could also depend on how this cue is processed 
(see Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
and (c) volumes of the journals with the largest number of involvement 
studies. 
Criteria for including studies in the sample were that (a) subjects were 
adults or adolescents not sampled from abnormal populations; (b) sub- 
jects received a persuasive me~_~; (c) subjects indicated their accep- 
tance of the position advocated in the message; and (d) involvement 
(or a variable such as personal relevance that we deemed identical to 
involvement) was used in the analyses ofpersuasive effects. Studies were 
eliminated if involvement was operationalized in a manner that did not 
clearly vary the relevance ofthe issue considered inthe message tosub- 
jects' self-concepts (e.g., Isaacson, 1974; Tsal, 1985). In addition, studies 
were liminated if(a) the message subjects received consisted of a mere 
statement ofa position on an issue, unaccompanied by argumentation 
(e.g., Eagly, 1967; Freedman, 1964; H. J. Greenwald, 1964; Zimbardo, 
1960); (b) involvement was varied by classifying subjects on responses 
assessed after they received the persuasive message ( .g., Boyd, 1978; 
McGinnies, 1968, 1973); (c) involvement was varied in a manner that 
obviously confounded involvement with another variable (e.~, attitudi- 
nal position in Hovland et al., 1957, and C. W. Sherifet al., 196~!~lis- 
traction in Gardner, Mitchell, & Russo, 1978, 1985); (d) in an after-only 
design in which involvement was manipulated by varying consumer 
products, a difference inattitudes toward the products probably existed 
prior to the experimental session and compromised interpretation f
subjects' attitudes in terms of persuasion (e.g., Bowen & Chalfe¢, 1974; 
Chebat & Picard, 1985); (e) involvement was manipulated after subjects 
received the persuasive message (Pentony, 1986, 1987); (f) a check on 
the involvement independent variable failed to reach a marginal level 
of significance, p <.  10 (e.g., Scileppi, 1973; Sorrentino et al., 1988, 
Study I); 7 and (g) the document reporting the study did ~ot provide 
information sufficient for the computation ofeffect sizes (Huddleston, 
1986; Schumann, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1984). Also excluded were studies 
or conditions within studies in which subjects received proattitudinal 
messages (e.g, Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b, Study I; Stoltenber~ 1982) 
or in which an unusual set was established for receiving the persuasive 
me~__ge ( .g., the warning conditions of Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a; the 
rhetorical questions conditions of Petty, Cacioppo, & Heesacker, 1981) 
or for responding tothe attitudinal measure (e.g., the bogus pipeline 
conditions ofSchul & Knapp, 1984). Shechter's (1987/1988) conditions 
that presented partners holding favorable or unfavorable attitudes were 
removed because these were atypical of impression-relevant manipula- 
tions. Finally, Neises's (1988) conditions of extreme issue involvement 
and temporary esponse involvement were removed because these were 
atypical of outcome-relevant d impression-relevant manipulations, 
respectively. 
Variables Coded From Each Study 
The following information was coded from each report: (a) date of 
publication; (b) publication form (journal article, other published docu- 
ment, dissertation rmaster's thesis); (c) message l ngth, in words (esti- 
mated in some instances); (d) amount of prior knowledge that subjects 
possessed about he issue discussed inthe m ~  (little or none: e.~, 
comprehensive exams for college seniors, novel brands of products; 
moderate: .g., chest X-rays, university uition increases; considerable: 
e.g., abortion, the Vietnam War, knowledge covaried with involvement: 
i.e., high- and low-involvement conditions used different issues, which 
differed in amount of prior knowledge); (e) m~_~__~ modality (print, 
7 Included as manipulation checks were self-report measures ofin- 
volvement (e.g., subjects' elf-relx)rts of involvement, importance, or 
concern) but not reports of subjects' memory for the details of the ma- 
nipulation (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, main experiment). Studies 
without manipulation checks were retained because there was no evi- 
dence that he variation of involvement was unsuccessful. 
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audio, video); (f) number of issues used per level of involvement; (g) 
message domain (college issues, social issues, consumer products, more 
than one domain); (h) type of involvement (value relevant, outcome 
relevant, impression relevant); 8 (i) method of involvement variation 
(description of differing consequences forsubjects of adopting the posi- 
tion advocated in message: .g., the advocated policy would take effect 
next year versus 10 years hence; classification ofsubjects based on their 
judgments of an issue: e.g., latitudes of acceptance, rejection, or both; 
presentation f issues differing in level of involvement; e.g., appropriate 
male- and female-related career choices versus the postwar status of 
Paul von Hindenburg; other methods: e.g., making salient he relation 
between subjects' attitude and central or peripheral values); (j) status 
of involvement in the experimental design (between subjects, within 
subjects); (k) presence of involvement manipulation check (present, ab- 
sent); (1) outcome of manipulation check (significant, mixed or mar- 
ginal, unknown or check absent); (m) name given to involvement varia- 
tion by the study author or authors (involvement, other name); (n) type 
of subject population (high school, college undergraduate); (o)quality 
of persuasion measure (single item; multi-item, unknown reliability; 
multi-item, high reliability, defined as a > .70); and (p) metric for per- 
suasion measure (posttest, including change scores based on single con- 
trol group mean; covariance-adjusted posttest or change score based on 
differences from subjects' own pretest; change score based on differ- 
ences from high- and low-involvement control groups). These variables 
were coded by the authors, with a median agreement of 100%. 9 Dis- 
agreements were resolved by discussion or, in the case of message l ngth, 
by averaging estimates, which were highly correlated, r = .97. 
Argument Strength 
The strength of the arguments supporting the position advocated in 
each available persuasive message was estimated using 182 undergradu- 
ate respondents who judged these arguments. Each argument was sum- 
marized in one or two sentences and presented to the respondents in 
questionnaire form. If more than three arguments were available for a 
message, the first and last were presented, and one was taken at random 
from the middle of the message. If three or fewer were available, all 
were used. The questionnaire instructed the respondents to read each 
argument carefully and to decide how strong an argument i made for 
the recommended position, which was displayed immediately below 
each argument. The questionnaire d fined a strong argument as one 
that "you feel would be difficult to refute or argue against." Finally, 
respondents were told to try to disregard their own opinions about he 
policies when making their judgments and to make their judgment for 
each statement independently of their judgments of other statements. 
After reading two examples illustrating the task, subjects rated the argu- 
ments on 15-point scales anchored by very weak and very strong. Each 
respondent completed a version of the questionnaire containing one 
third of the arguments. 
Ratings of arguments from the same message were averaged. As a 
check on the validity of respondents' judgments, the mean ratings of 
sets of arguments hat researchers had manipulated tobe strong or weak 
(e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 19791~lCwere compared and found to differ sig- 
nificantly (ps < .05 or smaller) in the expected irections. 
Computation and Analysis o f  Effect Sizes 
The effect size calculated isg, the difference between the persuasion 
means of the high- and low-involvement groups, divided by the pooled 
standard eviation (see Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In this study, the com- 
putation ofg was based on (a) F and t for 80.0% of the studies, (b) means 
and standard eviations or error terms for 17.5% of the studies, and (c) 
proportions of high- and low-involvement subjects who changed their 
attitudes for 2.5% of the studies. Two studies (Leippe & Elkin, 1987; 
Neises, 1988) manipulated two types of involvement; in these cases, a 
separate ffect size was computed for each manipulation, l° In studies 
that manipulated argument strength or number of argnments, eparate 
within-study effect sizes were also computed within each level of the 
manipulation.~ i For the one study that crossed the strength and number 
ofarguments in a factorial design (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), effect sizes 
were computed within each of the resulting combinations of strength 
and number. 
The pooled standard eviation that is the denominator f the effect 
size was estimated, whenever possible, only from the portion of each 
study's data entering into the effect size. For example, if an involvement 
effect size was calculated within the strong-arguments condition of a 
study, the pooled standard eviation was estimated from the standard 
deviations given for the strong-arguments subjects, if this information 
was available. 
When the pooled standard eviation was estimated from the mean 
square rror of an analysis of variance (ANOVA), this error term was 
sometimes reconstituted by adding into the sum of squares error all 
(available) between-groups sums of squares except that for involvement. 
By this procedure, recommended by Hedges and Becker (1986) and 
Glass, McGaw, and Smith (1981), one-way designs can be approxi- 
mated. The procedure was followed for individual-difference variables 
that were crossed with involvement but not for manipulated variables, 
which in some experiments were quite powerful. Consequently, adding 
sums of squares for manipulated variables (e.g., argument strength, 
communicator c edibility) to the sum of squares error would have had 
d!ffering impact on these rror terms, across the studies. 
Glass et al. (198 l) recommended that criterion measures reported in 
terms of gain scores or covariance-adjusted posttest scores rather than 
posttest scores hould be converted to the metric of posttest scores, in 
order to ensure greater comparability between the effect sizes. This con- 
version was not performed because the correlation between the pretest 
and posttest scores, which is needed for the conversion, was not avail- 
able in any of the studies that used change scores or covariance-adjusted 
posttest scores. 
These effect sizes were computed independently b each of us, who 
then resolved any discrepancies. The gs were converted to ds by correct- 
ing them for bias (i.e., g's overestimate of the population effect size, 
which occurs especially for small samples; see Hedges, 1981; Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985). Then the study outcomes were combined by. averaging the 
(text continues on page 301 ) 
s Our classification ofthe Rhine and Severance (1970) study as value 
relevant may be puzzling to readers because the issue used in the high- 
involvement condition, the desirability of increasing tuition at the Uni- 
versity of California, may seem to be the type of issue that would have 
activated outcome-relevant concerns among the University of Califor- 
nia, Riverside, students who served as subjects. Although the Rhine and 
Severance study may not be a clear-cut instance of value.relevant i - 
volvement, we believe that the issue aroused primarily value.relevant 
concerns because the study was conducted when "tuition was being ac- 
tively discussed by the regents of the university, the Governor of the 
state, the press, the faculty, and the students. A student march on the 
State Capitol had been held to protest suggestions for increased tuition" 
(Rhine & Severance, 1970, p. 177). 
9 Agreement was lowest (79%) for the outcome of the manipulation 
check. 
~o For each type of involvement, the low-involvement mean was sub- 
traeted from the high-involvement mean within the low-involvement 
condition ofthe second type of involvement, and the resulting difference 
was divided by the pooled standard eviation. 
~l This procedure was not followed for one study (Chaiken, 1980, 
Study 2) because itconfounded number ofargnments with communica- 
tor likability. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Study Characteristics 
Value-relevant Outcome-relevant Impression-relevant 
All studies involvement s udies involvement s udies involvement s udies 
Variable and class (n = 38) (n = 15) (n = 20") (n = 5) 
Mdn publication year 
Publication form 
Journal or other published ocument 
Dissertation or master's thesis 
Publication characteristics 
1979 1970 1984 1987 
27 9 16 3 
11 6 4 2 
Message characteristics 
M argument strength b 8.27 8.51 8.13 8.33 
M length of message in words c 562.31 625.33 554.20 539.80 
Amount of subjects' knowledge 
Little or none 16 1 15 2 
Moderate 10 2 5 3 
Considerable 9 9 0 0 
Knowledge covaried with involvement 3 3 0 0 
Message modality 
Print 26 10 13 4 
Audio 10 3 7 1 
Video 2 2 0 0 
Number of issues per level of 
involvement 
One 33 12 19 3 
Two 5 3 1 2 
Message domain 
College issues 16 0 16 2 
Social policy issues 16 13 1 2 
Consumer products 3 0 3 0 
More than one 3 2 0 1 
Involvement characteristics 
Method of involvement variation 
Differing consequences 23 0 20 5 
Subject classification 10 10 0 0 
Topics differing in level of involvement 3 3 0 0 
Other methods 2 2 0 0 
Status of involvement in experimental 
design 
Betw~n subjects 36 13 20 5 
Within subjects 2 2 0 0 
Presence of involvement manipulation 
check 
Present 19 5 12 2 
Absent 19 l0 8 3 
Outcome of manipulation check 
Significant 16 4 10 1 
Mixed or marginal 4 0 2 1 
Unknown or check absent 20 11 8 3 
Other method characteristics 
Type of subject population 
High school 4 3 0 1 
College undergraduate 34 12 20 4 
Mdn n of subjects 116 101 80 148 
Quality of persuasion measure 
Single item 8 2 5 1 
Multi-item, unknown reliability 19 12 5 2 
Multi-item, high reliability 11 i 10 2 
Metric for persuasion measure 
Posttest 23 1 i 9 5 
Covariance-adjusted posttest or 
change score based on subjects' 
pretest 13 12 I 0 
Change score based on involvement 
control groups 2 2 0 0 
Note. For categorical variables, numbers in table represent frequencies ofstudies in each class. 
Two studies (Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Neises, 1988) are represented twice, once in outcome-relevant i volvement and once in impression-relevant 
involvement. 
b Based on the mean for each study for which ratings were obtained; judgments are on a l-to- 15 scale in which higher numbers indicate greater 
strength. 
c Based on studies for which reports were available. 
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ds. The homogeneity of each set of ds was examined to determine 
whether the studies hared acommon effect size (Hedges, 1981; Hedges 
& Olkin, 1985). In the absence of homogeneity, we accounted for vari- 
ability in heterogeneous effect sizes by relating them to the attributes of
the studies. To determine the relation between these study characteris- 
tics and the magnitude of the effect sizes, both categorical nd continu- 
ous models were tested (Hedges, 1982a, 1982b; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). 
Categorical models, which are analogous to ANOVAS, may show that 
heterogeneous effect sizes are homogeneous within the subgroups estab- 
lished by dividing studies into classes based on study characteristics. 
Similarly, continuous models, which are analogous to regression 
models, are regarded as correctly specified when the systematic variabil- 
ity in the effect sizes is explained by the study attributes used as predic- 
tors. If homogeneity is not achieved within the classes when implement- 
ing categorical models and correctly specified models are not achieved 
when implementing continuous models, the results of these analyses 
cannot be interpreted asconfidently as they otherwise would be. 
As an alternative analysis to predicting effect sizes using categorical 
and continuous models, we attained homogeneity b  identifying outliers 
among the effect sizes and sequentially removing those that reduced the 
homogeneity statistic by the largest amount (see Hedges & Olkin, 1985). 
Using such a procedure, Hedges (1987) found for several recta-analyses 
on psychological topics that the removal of up to 20% of the outliers in 
a group of heterogeneous effect sizes usually resulted in a high degree 
of homogeneity. Studies yielding effect sizes identified as outliers can 
then be examined after the fact to determine if they appear to differ 
methodologically from the other studies. Inspection of the percentage 
of effect sizes removed to attain homogeneity allows one to determine 
whether the effect sizes are homogeneous a ide from the presence of 
relatively few aberrant values. Under such circumstances, the mean at- 
tained after emoval of such outliers may better represent the distribu- 
tion of effect sizes than would the mean based on all of the effect sizes. 
Results 
Characteristics ofStudies 
Before considering the effects of involvement on attitude 
change, we examine the characteristics of the studies from 
which conclusions about his research are drawn. Table I shows 
these study characteristics aggregated over all of the studies, as 
well as summarized separately within the classes of value-, out- 
come-, and impression-relevant involvement. Table 2 presents 
each study's involvement effect size (d) along with its 95% con- 
fidence interval (CI), study attributes, and a brief description of 
the issue used in each message. For studies that manipulated 
argument strength or number of arguments, effect sizes and 
confidence intervals are also presented within each level of 
these variables, along with the study characteristics that differed 
between these levels. 
Across all types of involvement, as is shown by the central 
tendencies of the variables in Table 1, studies (a) were either 
value or outcome relevant; (b) were published relatively re- 
cently; (c) were published in journals; (d) presented messages 
with argument strength at approximately the midpoint of the 
scale used for obtaining respondents' judgments; (e) presented 
messages of moderate length (about two double-spaced typed 
pages or 2 rain of speech); (f) used issues for which subjects had 
little (or no), moderate, or considerable prior knowledge; (g) 
presented messages via the print modality; (h) presented only 
one issue per level of involvement; (i) included or omitted ma- 
nipulation checks; (j) obtained a significant manipulation 
check when a check was present; (k) sampled subjects from col- 
lege undergraduate populations; (1) used a moderate number of 
subjects; (m) assessed persuasion via multiple-item easures of 
unknown reliability; and (o) used either posttest or change score 
metrics, m2 Within the classes of involvement studies, notable 
exceptions to these overall patterns are that (a) value-relevant 
studies were published earlier than studies on the other two 
types of involvement; (b) outcome-relevant studies had smaller 
sample sizes than the other two types of studies, a trend that 
reflects our exclusion of some of the experimental conditions of 
several of the outcome-relevant studies; (e) subjects were more 
knowledgeable onthe issues used in value-relevant studies than 
on the issues used in outcome-relevant studies; (d) value-rele- 
vant studies used social policy issues to a greater extent han 
did outcome-relevant studies, which typically used college is- 
sues; (e) value-relevant studies usually varied involvement by 
subject classification methods, whereas outcome- and impres- 
sion-relevant s udies manipulated involvement by describing 
differing consequences to the subjects; and (f) value-relevant 
studies typically presented findings in a change-score metric, 
whereas outcome- and impression-relevant studies presented 
them in a posttest metric. 
Study Effect Sizes 
With each study contributing a single effect size, a mean was 
computed with each of the effect sizes weighted by the recipro- 
cal of its variance (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). This weighting pro- 
cedure gives greater weight o effect sizes that are more reliably 
estimated. The resulting mean was -0.21, indicating reater 
persuasion with low involvement than with high involvement. 
The 95% confidence interval for this mean, CI = -0.27 to 
-0.15, shows that it differed significantly from the 0.00 value 
that indicates exactly no effect. Calculation of a homogeneity 
statistic, Q, which has an approximate chi-square distribution 
with k - 1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of effect 
sizes (Hedges, 1982a; Hedges & Olkin, 1985), indicated that the 
hypothesis of homogeneity was rejected, Q(39) = 190.83, p < 
.001. Therefore, study attributes were used to account for vari- 
ability in the involvement effect sizes. 
Categorical models. Categorical models were fitted to the 
effect sizes following Hedges and Olkin's (1985) statistical pro- 
cedures. These techniques provide a between-classes ffect 
(analogous to a main effect in an ANOVA) and a test of the homo- 
geneity of the effect sizes within each class. The between-classes 
effect is estimated by QB, which has an approximate chi-square 
distribution with p - 1 degrees of freedom, where p is the num- 
ber of classes. The homogeneity of the effect sizes within each 
class is estimated by Qw~, which has an approximate chi-square 
distribution with m - 1 degrees of freedom, where m is the 
number of effect sizes in the class. The tables reporting tests of 
categorical models also include (a) the mean weighted effect size 
for each class, calculated with each effect size weighted by the 
reciprocal of its variance, and (b) the 95% confidence interval 
for each mean (Tables 3, 4, and 7). 
12 All of the studies in the sample assessed persuasion via a question- 
naire measure of attitudes or beliefs administered soon after the persua- 
sive message. Delayed measures were not used for this recta-analysis. 
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Table 3 
Test of Categorical Model for Type of Involvement 
95% CI for di+ Homogeneity 
Between-classes Mean weighted within each 
Variable and class effect (QB) n effect size (di+) Lower Upper class (Qwi)a 
Type of involvement 68.68"* 
Value relevant 15 -0.48 -0.57 -0.40 73.17"* 
Outcome relevant 20 0.02 -0.06 0.10 40.68" 
Impression relevant 5 -0.17 -0.33 -0.01 6.57 
Note. Effect sizes are positive for differences inthe high-involvement direction and negative for differences 
in the low-involvement direction. CI = confidence interval. 
a Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity. 
*p <.01. **p < .001. 
Categorical model for type of involvement. Consistent with 
the significant between-classes effect for type of involvement 
shown in Table 3, a priori comparisons among the mean 
weighted effect sizes for the three classes of involvement 
(Hedges & Becker, 1986; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) showed that 
the mean for the value-relevant class differed significantly from 
the means for both the outcome- and impression-relevant 
classes, ×2(1) = 68.45, and x2(l) = 11.73, respectively, ps < 
.001. As is shown by the 95% confidence intervals computed for 
these classes, low-involvement subjects were significantly more 
persuaded than high-involvement subjects in the value-relevant 
and impression-relevant studies, whereas involvement had no 
significant overall effect in the outcome-relevant studies. These 
results were not unexpected because for outcome-relevant stud- 
ies, involvement's effects hould depend on the strength of the 
persuasive message, which is not taken into account in this 
study-level analysis. 
As is shown in Table 3 by the homogeneity statistic (Qw) for 
each class, only the impression-relevant class was homoge- 
neous) 3In the value-relevant class, homogeneity was attained 
after the removal of three effect sizes (20%) identified as outliers, 
Qw(11) = 18.36, p = .07. In order of decreasing reduction of 
homogeneity, the removed studies were Aiello (1967), Sereno 
(1968), and Rhine and Severance (1970). The resulting mean 
weighted effect size was -0.32 (CI = -0.42 to -0.21). We did 
not identify outliers among the outcome-relevant studies until 
they were partitioned on argument strength (see next section). 
Study and Within-Study Effect Sizes 
Categorical models for argument strength within type of in- 
volvement. In order to test the hypothesis that involvement in- 
teracts with the strength of the persuasive message to affect per- 
suasion, we applied categorical models to the 60 study and with- 
in-study effect sizes that we had available after the studies that 
manipulated the strength or number of persuasive arguments 
were partitioned on this basis. For the categorical models, 
classes were formed on the basis of the strength of the argu- 
ments, and the number of arguments was taken into account by 
treating message l ngth as a predictor in the continuous models 
presented in the next subsection. In the categorical models, all 
studies that did not manipulate argument strength were as- 
signed to the weak or strong category on the basis of the mean 
judgments we obtained for these studies' persuasive arguments. 
Weak arguments were defined as those with mean judgments 
lower than the upper boundary of the mean judgments obtained 
for arguments labeled weak by study authors. Studies for which 
persuasive arguments were unavailable were omitted from this 
analysis. 
Table 4 presents the results of tests of categorical models for 
argument strength within each of the classes of involvement 
effect sizes. As is indicated by the mean argument strength rat- 
ings associated with the strong and weak classes, the weak argu- 
ments used in the outcome- and impression-relevant studies 
were weaker than those used in the value-relevant studies. Thus, 
the relatively weak argumentation was not comparable across 
the three types of involvement studies, whereas the relatively 
strong argumentation was quite comparable. 
Within the value-relevant group of effect sizes, the between- 
classes effect and the means and confidence intervals for the 
strong- and weak-argument classes how that high-involvement 
subjects were less persuaded than low-involvement subjects, but 
this difference was smaller with strong than with weak argu- 
ments. The strong-arguments class was homogeneous, and the 
weak-arguments class became homogeneous with the removal 
of one study (Aiello, 1967), Qw(4) = 5.28, p = .26. The resulting 
mean effect size was -0.38 (CI = -0.54 to -0.23). 
With outcome-relevant i volvement, high-involvement sub- 
jects were more persuaded by strong arguments and less per- 
suaded by weak arguments han were low-involvement subjects, 
but neither the strong- nor the weak-arguments class was homo- 
geneous. Removal of one study (5%; Liberman, 1988) from the 
strong-arguments class established homogeneity, Qw(16) = 
19.52, p = .24. The resulting mean effect size was 0.41 (CI = 
0.28 to 0.53). Homogeneity was not attained for the weak-argu- 
ments class until a relatively large proportion of effect sizes (n = 
4; 24%) were removed, Qw(12) = 17.51, p = .13. In order of 
decreasing reduction of homogeneity, the removed studies were 
Leippe and Elkin (1987), Fredericks (1988), Petty, Cacioppo, 
and Schumann (1983), and Petty and Cacioppo (1984, nine- 
13 When interpreting the finding that the hypothesis of homogeneity 
was not rejected for this and other groups of effect sizes, readers should 
keep in mind that the relatively small number of effect sizes we had 
available limited our power to detect deviations from homogeneity. 
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Table 4 
Tests of Argument-Strength Categorical Model for Studies of Value-Relevant, Outcome- 
Relevant and Impression-Relevant Involvement 
Variable and class 
Mean Mean 
argument Between weighted 95% CI for d~+ Homogeneity 
strength classes effect size within each 
judgments" effect (QB) /1 (di+) Lower Upper class (Qwi) b 
Value-relevant i volvement 
Argument strength 9.80" 
Strong 9.09 6 -0.28 -0.42 -0.14 10.74 
Weak 7.93 6 -0.58 -0.71 -0.45 27.93"* 
Outcome-relevant involvement 
Argument strength 43.15 ** 
Strong 9.35 18 0.31 0.19 0.43 37.49* 
Weak 6.86 17 -0.26 -0.39 -0.14 63.54** 
Impression-relevant involvement 
Argument strength 0.00 
Strong 9.28 6 -0.17 -0.37 0.02 8.02 
Weak 6.20 3 -0.17 -0.44 0.11 0.14 
Note. Effect sizes are positive for differences in the high-involvement direction and negative for differences 
in the low-involvement direction. The values are based on the available messages. CI = confidence interval. 
"On a l-to- 15 scale in which higher numbers indicate greater strength. 
b Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis ofhomogeneity. 
*p<.01. **p <.001. 
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arguments condition). The resulting mean effect size was -0.21 
(CI = -0.35 to -0.07). The between-classes effect for argument 
strength was not significant within the impression-relevant 
group, which was homogeneous overall, Q(8) = 8.16, p = .42.14 
Continuous models for argument s rength and message l ngth 
within type of involvement. Continuous models were used in 
order to test he effects of argument s rength and message l ngth 
on the magnitude ofthe involvement effect sizes available after 
partitioning the studies on the strength and number of argu- 
ments. These analyses are appropriate only within the classes 
of value- and outcome-relevant studies because the impression- 
relevant class contained only nine effect sizes, which were ho- 
mogeneous) 5 Although it would have been preferable to treat 
number of arguments (rather than message l ngth) as an inde- 
pendent variable in the continuous models, information on 
length was much more frequently included in the reports, and 
length can be assumed to covary with the number of arguments. 
Finally, to assess the simultaneous impact of argument s rength 
and message l ngth, amultiple regression model including both 
of these variables was assessed. 16 
The continuous models are least squares regressions, calcu- 
lated with each effect size weighted by the reciprocal of its vari- 
ance. Each such model yields a test of the significance of each 
predictor as well as a test of model specification, which evalu- 
ates whether significant systematic variation remains unex- 
plained in the regression model (Hedges, 1982b; Hedges & Ol- 
kin, 1985). The sum of squares error statistic, QE, which pro- 
vides this test of model specification, has an approximate 
chi-square distribution with k - p - 1 degrees of freedom, 
where k is the number of effect sizes and p is the number of 
predictors (not including the intercept). 
Shown in Table 5 are the results for the continuous models for 
the value-relevant i volvement effect sizes. In both the simple 
linear regression and the multiple regression, strength related 
positively to the magnitude ofeffect sizes. Thus, consistent with 
the categorical model for argument s rength (see Table 4), as the 
strength of the argumentation increased, the tendency for low- 
involvement subjects to be more persuaded than high-involve- 
ment subjects was weakened. Finally, although message l ngth 
did not relate to the effect sizes in the simple linear egression, 
it related negatively tothem when analyzed in conjunction with 
argument strength. Thus, as the length of the messages in- 
~4 In this categorical model, both the fix-arguments condition and 
the two-arguments condition of Chaiken (1980, Study I) appear in the 
strong-arguments category. When the categories were defined instead 
as the strong-message nd weak-message categories and Chaiken's ix- 
arguments condition was therefore classified as strong and her two-argn- 
ments condition as weak (but the other studies' conditions remained 
classified as weak or strong on the basis of argument s rength), the be- 
tween-classes effect remained nonsignificant. 
t5 The continuous models were initially estimated without the studies 
for which message length or argument s rength were unknown. Because 
the results were essentially unchanged by assigning to these studies (or 
to conditions within the studies) values based on the means for their 
respective classes, only the models that substituted means for missing 
values are presented. 
~6 These models do not include the interaction of message l ngth and 
argument s rength because this term proved to be nonsignificant. 
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Table 5 
Tests of Argument-Strength and Message-Length Continuous 
Models for Value-Relevant I volvement S udies 
Simple linear Multiple 
regression regression 
Predictor or 
outcome b b * b b * 
Argument strength 
Message l ngth 
Additive constant 
Multiple R 
SE of estimate 
QE b 
0.30** .47 0.45** .70 





Note. Models are weighted least squares regressions calculated with 
weights equal to the reciprocal of the variance for each effect size. In the 
multiple regression, the predictors were entered simultaneously; b = 
unstandardized regression coefficient; b* = standardized regression co- 
efficient. Effect sizes are positive for differences in the high-involvement 
direction and negative for differences inthe low-involvement direction; 
n=15. 
a b = -0.00049; SE(b) = .00022. b Significance indicates model not 
correctly specified. 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
creased, the tendency for low-involvement subjects to be more 
persuaded than high-involvement subjects was strengthened. 
As is reflected in the multiple R of.54, this model was moder- 
ately successful in accounting for variability in the magnitude 
of the effect sizes, although the test of model specification (QE) 
showed that it cannot be regarded as correctly specified. 
The same models were assessed within the outcome-relevant 
involvement class. As is shown in Table 6 under Simple linear 
regression and Multiple regression A, only argument strength 
was found to significantly influence the magnitude of the effect 
sizes in these models. Consistent with the categorical model for 
argument strength (see Table 4), with strong arguments, high- 
involvement subjects were more persuaded than low-involve- 
ment subjects, and with weak arguments the opposite pattern 
was obtained. Yet the multiple R of.37 indicated that argument 
strength was only somewhat successful in accounting for vari- 
ability in the magnitude of the outcome-relevant effect sizes. 
Not surprisingly, this model cannot be regarded as correctly 
specified; the QE statistic was again highly significant. 
Other predictors of outcome-relevant i volvement effect sizes. 
In view of the surprising finding that argument strength ac- 
counted for more variability in the value-relevant effect sizes 
than in the outcome-relevant effect sizes, we decided to search 
for other study characteristics that could account for this dis- 
parity. Aside from the variation in argument strength and mes- 
sage length that we have already examined, the outcome-rele- 
vant studies were methodologically quite similar. However, pe- 
rusal of the outcome-relevant effect sizes suggested that the 
studies authored by Petty, Cacioppo, and their colleagues ob- 
tained the predicted effects of argument s rength, whereas other 
researchers obtained them more weakly or not at all. An excep- 
tion to this pattern is the study by Leippe and Elkin (1987), 
which produced much larger effects than were typically ob- 
tained by the Petty and Cacioppo group. Because Leippe, like 
Petty and Cacioppo, obtained the PhD from Ohio State Univer- 
sity in the late 1970s, the expected pattern of results might be 
described as obtained only by a particular group of researchers. 
Therefore, we classified the studies according to research group, 
placing the Leippe and Elkin study with the Petty and Caeioppo 
studies in a class that we have labeled, merely for convenience, 
the Ohio State researchers and placing the remaining studies in 
a class we labeled other esearchersJ 7 
To examine the effect of argument strength within each re- 
search group, we estimated a simple linear regression model 
with argument strength as the predictor of the involvement 
effect sizes. Within the Ohio State group, argument strength 
was a substantial predictor of the effect sizes (b = 0.30, b* = 
.72, p < .001; QE(t9) = 58.08, p < .001), whereas among the 
other esearchers, argument strength failed to predict he effect 
sizes (b = -0.04, b* = -.23, p = .23; QE(I 3) = 25.24, p < .05). 
To fully represent this interaction between research group and 
the effects of argument strength, we used the effect sizes of both 
groups and estimated a model that included as predictors argu- 
ment strength, research group, and their interaction (see Table 
6, under Multiple regression B). The results showed that this 
interaction was indeed significant and that this model was con- 
siderably more successful in accounting for variability in the 
effect sizes, as is shown by its multiple R of .66. Because this 
model was not well specified, we proceeded to calculate categor- 
ical models that took research group into account, in order to 
determine whether the lack of homogeneity was confined to cer- 
tain subgroups of studies. These models, which are presented 
in Table 7, show that research group was a highly significant 
predictor of effect size magnitude, within both the strong- and 
weak-arguments classes. With strong arguments, the Ohio State 
group obtained the predicted positive mean effect size, whereas 
the other esearchers found a mean effect size that did not differ 
from zeroJ s Similarly, with weak arguments, the Ohio State 
group obtained the predicted negative mean effect size, whereas 
the other esearchers found a mean effect size that did not differ 
from zero. Two of the four subclasses lacked homogeneity: 
strong arguments subclass for other esearchers and weak argu- 
ments ubclass for Ohio State researchers. 
Among the many possible reasons that the Ohio State group 
obtained stronger effects of argument strength is that their ma- 
nipulations of this variable were more impactful. We tested this 
hypothesis by performing a Research Group (Ohio State vs. 
other) × Argument Strength Label (weak vs. strong) ANOVA on 
the studies" mean argument strength ratings. Although this 
analysis found the expected large effect for argument strength, 
F(l, 32) = 92.27, p < .001, neither the main effect of group nor 
the interaction proved significant (Fs < 1). Thus, this hypothe- 
sis failed to be confirmed by this analysis or, for that matter, by 
Multiple regression B, which controlled the interaction for the 
17 Of course, the term Ohio State researchers should not be taken to 
imply that he environment ortraining provided by Ohio State Univer- 
sity is causally related to obtaining these ffects. The models that in- 
eluded research group (see tex0, were estimated with the Leippe and 
EIkin (1987) study being categorized in the other esearchers group as 
well as being excluded from the analyses. Our results were essentially 
unchanged by these alternative classifications. 
Js This model remained significant when the one outlying effect size 
(Liberman, 1988) was deleted, QB(l) = 4.94, p < .05. 
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effects of argument strength.m9 Our search for additional study 
characteristics that might account for the disparity between the 
Ohio State researchers' findings and those of other researchers 
was not successful, z° 
Discussion 
In this review, we have defined involvement as a motivational 
state induced by an association between an activated attitude 
and the self-concept. The findings we obtained are largely con- 
gruent with our proposal that involvement has taken three dis- 
tinct forms in attitude-change research, depending on whether 
the aspect of the self-concept that was activated is one's endur- 
ing values (establishing value-relevant i volvement), one's abil- 
ity to obtain desirable outcomes (establishing outcome-relevant 
involvement), orthe impression one makes on others (establish- 
ing impression-relevant involvement). 
We found that (a) with value-relevant i volvement, high-in- 
volvement subjects were less persuaded than low-involvement 
subjects; (b) with outcome-relevant i volvement, high-involve- 
ment subjects were more persuaded than low-involvement sub- 
jects by strong arguments and less persuaded by weak argu- 
ments; and (c) with impression-relevant i volvement, high- 
involvement subjects were slightly less persuaded than 
low-involvement subjects. Although there are some important 
qualifications tothese generalizations, these results confirm our 
view that the effects of involvement on attitude change cannot 
be described in an informative way without using a label denot- 
ing the aspect of the self-concept from which involvement de- 
rives. 
Value-Relevant I volvement 
The findings for value-relevant involvement are reasonably 
clear: Involvement of this type typically inhibits attitude 
change. The mean weighted effect size was -0.48, which corre- 
sponds to a correlation of - .23, a moderately strong effect. 
However, the effect sizes aggregated into this mean were not ho- 
mogeneous across the studies. Removal of 20% of the studies in 
this class via outlier-removal techniques resulted in a homoge- 
neous set of effect sizes. 2~ When all of the value-relevant effect 
sizes were analyzed, message characteristics accounted for a 
portion (29%) of the variability in the effect sizes. Because these 
analyses howed that the tendency for involvement to inhibit 
persuasion was weakened by strong arguments, the resistance 
to persuasion conferred by value-relevant i volvement can ap- 
parently be overcome to some extent by cogent argumentation. 
Yet, as Table 4 shows, even with strong arguments, value-rele- 
vant involvement inhibited persuasion. 
The models predicting value-relevant effect sizes were not 
correctly specified, but this result is understandable in view of 
the many different methods investigators have used to opera- 
tionalize this type of involvement. Although most of these stud- 
ies classified subjects via their pretest judgments of the issue 
discussed in the persuasive message, the type of data that pro- 
vided the basis for this classification differed greatly across the 
studies (e.g., widths of latitudes of rejection and acceptance, rat- 
ings of issue importance), as did the specific criteria used to 
divide the samples (e.g., median splits, extreme groups). These 
differences in the ways that subjects were classified via their own 
responses were too varied and complex to take into account in 
the meta-analysis, given the relatively few studies that are avail- 
able. Moreov~, three studies presented subjects with issues that 
differed in level of involvement, and two (classified as other 
methods) used experimental manipulations that can be viewed 
as linking the issue to the high-involvement subjects' values. It 
would indeed be surprising if such disparate methods of varying 
involvement had a consistent impact on persuasion. 
Although diversity in the methods of varying value-relevant 
involvement may pose difficulties when attempting to account 
for variability in the effect sizes, this variety can be considered 
an advantage in another espect. This advantage accrues when 
considering whether a contaminating variable that covaried 
~9 Although our findings greatly reduce the plausibility of explaining 
the divergent findings in terms of the argument s rength manipulations, 
subjects in the original experiments might have perceived the arguments 
somewhat differently from the students who served as judges for our 
argument-rating task. Unfortunately, it was not possible to compare 
studies' argument-strength manipulations in terms of their manipula- 
tion-check findings. Although all investigators who reported checks on 
their argument-strength manipulations found them highly significant, 
the measures that they interpreted as checks were somewhat diverse 
(e.g., judgments of argument s rength, various indices based on the va- 
lence of thoughts reported by subjects), precluding unambiguous com- 
parisons across tudies. Also, it was not possible to compare most stud- 
ies in terms of the proportions ofpositive and negative thoughts elicited 
by the persuasive messages. These proportions are consequential for the 
elaboration likelihood model in view of Petty and Cacioppo's (1986a, 
p. 32) operational definition of strong messages a  those that elicit pre- 
dominantly positive thoughts and that of weak messages a  those that 
elicit predominately negative thoughts. 
20 For example, we examined whether the other esearchers u ed is- 
sues about which subjects were more knowledgeable. However, we had 
coded 15 of the 20 outcome-relevant studies as using low-knowledge- 
ability issues; among the 5 studies using higher-knowledgeability issues, 
2 were conducted by the Ohio State researchers and 3 by the other e- 
searchers. Nonetheless, we caution readers that many classes of explana- 
tions for the instability of the effects of outcome-relevant i volvement 
cannot be tested by our meta-analytic methods. For example, the Ohio 
State researchers may have had more impactful involvement manipula- 
tions, even though the manipulations were procedurally very similar. 
Unfortunately, many studies (40%) lacked an appropriate manipulation 
check on involvement, making it impossible for us to adequately test 
this possibility. Another possibility is that the Ohio State researchers 
may have avoided publishing weaker findings, whereas other esearch- 
ers, who are presumably less committed toPetty and Cacioppo's predic- 
tions, may have been more than willing to report such findings. Finally, 
we remind readers that our meta-analysis is not concerned with testing 
the elaboration likelihood model but with exploring the utility of distin- 
guishing three types of involvement. Had we wished to test he elabora- 
tion likelihood model, we would have included the effect sizes for the 
impact of argument s rength within levels of involvement, the contrasts 
that Petty and Cacioppo ( ! 986a, 1986b) have considered more crucial 
to their theory than the effects of involvement within levels of argument 
strength (see Footnote 25). 
2~ Two of these outliers (Aiello, !967; Rhine & Severance, 1970), 
which obtained large effects in the predicted direction, manipulated in- 
volvement by the presentation messages on issues varying in level of 
involvement. Manipulations ofthis type are particularly vulnerable to 
confounding in terms of knowledgeability about he issues and possibly 
other factors (see discussion of confounding later in this section). 
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with involvement produced the resistance to persuasion docu- 
mented by our meta-analysis. Although we removed from our 
sample all studies with clear-cut evidence of confounding, we 
suspect that involvement was sometimes correlated to some ex- 
tent with variables that could be considered confounds (e.g., 
knowledgeability about issues, confidence in own attitudinal 
position, accessibility of counterarguments), especially in the 
studies that varied involvement by classifying subjects or vary- 
ing the issue of the persuasive message. Yet, because this re- 
search used diverse methods of varying involvement, the exact 
nature of any confounding would have differed across the stud- 
ies, rendering less plausible any argument that a single con- 
found explains the effects of value-relevant i volvement. Thus, 
a critic who desires to dismiss the effects of value-relevant i - 
volvement on the basis of presumed confounding must con- 
struct a series of special-purpose hypotheses for each of the sev- 
eral types of manipulations used in this research and further- 
more argue that these confounds were the main determinant of
persuasion rather than the value-relevant involvement postu- 
lated by the researchers who produced the studies. Although 
the confounding issue cannot be satisfactorily resolved without 
relevant primary research, we doubt hat the persuasion-inhib- 
iting effect of value-relevant i volvement can be dismissed sim- 
ply on the basis of presumed confounding. 
Other predictors not included in our recta-analysis might 
have explained additional variance in the magnitude of the 
value-relevant effect sizes. In particular, when considering this 
type of involvement, heorists have sometimes taken into ac- 
count the discrepancy between the message and subjects' posi- 
tions (e.g., .C.W. Sherif et al., 1965). We did not include this 
variable in this recta-analysis because preliminary analyses in- 
dicated that partitioning the findings according to investigators' 
labeling of their discrepancy conditions did not improve predic- 
tion of the effect sizes. Nonetheless, the implications of this re- 
sult remain ambiguous because discrepancy may not have been 
manipulated with similar enough operations to allow meaning- 
ful comparisons across the studies. 
Outcome-Relevant I volvement 
As was expected, outcome-relevant i volvement did not in- 
fluence persuasion as a main effect but instead interacted with 
the strength of the argumentation contained in messa~_,,es to fa- 
cilitate persuasion with strong arguments and inhibit it with 
weak arguments. However, these trends were qualified by the 
fact that the effect sizes were not homogeneous within either the 
strong- or the weak-arguments class. The mean effect size for the 
strong-arguments class was 0.32, slightly smaller in magnitude 
than the mean effect size found for the value-relevant class. The 
removal of only one outlier (5%) produced homogeneity and a 
mean effect size of 0.42. 22 Because our analysis revealed only 
one outlier, this class may be reasonably described as sharing a
common mean effect size. 
The mean effect size for the weak-arguments class was nega- 
tive and somewhat smaller in magnitude, d+ = -0.26. The re- 
moval of four oufliers (24%) resulted in homogeneity and a 
slight decrease in the magnitude of the mean effect size, d+ = 
-0.21. 23 Because homogeneity was not attained until a rela- 
tively large proportion of effect sizes were removed, this class of 
effect sizes may be considered particularly unstable. The fact 
that researchers have not consistently found that outcome-rele- 
vant involvement inhibits the persuasion i duced by weak argu- 
mentation suggests that the conditions necessary to produce 
this effect may be complex. In addition to experimental proce- 
dures, these conditions could include characteristics rarely 
described in experimental research on persuasion such as par- 
ticular distributions of prior attitudes and other individual- 
difference variables (see Sorrentino et al., 1988), study charac- 
teristics that we were unable to code and control in our analyses. 
Despite the instability of results found for weak-arguments 
conditions, we believe that the force of the evidence obtained 
from studies of outcome-relevant i volvement provides ub- 
stantial support for our contention that this type of involvement 
is distinct from value-relevant involvement. Specifically, this 
support derives from the tendency for outcome-relevant i -
volvement to increase persuasion with strong arguments, an 
effect hat was relatively consistent across the studies. Whereas 
outcome-relevant involvement facilitates persuasion with 
strong arguments, value-relevant involvement inhibits persua- 
sion, regardless of argument strength. 
Moreover, if other evidence regarding human information 
processing is made known, the idea that outcome-relevant i - 
volvement typically affects persuasion egatively with weak at- 
22 The Liberman (1988) study, which produced a reversal of the pre- 
dicted positive ffect, used an issue (the desirability of essay exams in- 
stead of multiple-choice exams) about which the subjects were knowl- 
edgeable on the basis of personal experience; perhaps subjects did not 
revise their attitudes, even when confronted by arguments hat hey ac- 
knowledged were strong, because personal experience outweighed any 
and all arguments about he general impact of exams on students. 
23 The Leippe and Elkin (1987) study, which produced an extremely 
large effect size in the predicted irection, was atypical in its use of a 
student as the source of the persuasive message. Other studies typically 
used a more prestigious source or at least ascribed the position advo- 
cated in the message to a prestigious source (e.g., the president of the 
university or a faculty advisory committee). Perhaps a student source 
was very easily compromised byspecious arguments when the subjects 
processed these arguments carefully. In addition, Leippe and Elkin ran 
their subjects individually (i.e., one per session), whereas other esearch- 
ers typically ran subjects in groups. Perhaps individual administration 
of the experimental materials made the manipulations more impactive. 
The Fredericks ( i 988) study, which produced a reversal of the predicted 
effect, was atypical in its projection of the persuasive message onto a 
movie screen from which the subjects read. Also, subjects were video- 
taped while they read the message. Petty et al.'s (1983) experiment, 
which produced a large effect size in the predicted direction, was among 
the three studies presenting advertisements on consumer products. The 
product (a disposable razor) differed from those used in the other stud- 
ies in that many of the subjects probably took little interest in this prod- 
uct class (i.e., subjects who used electric razors or who did not shave). 
Perhaps close scrutiny of weak justifications for a product's quality 
more easily lowered subjects' evaluations when they had little reason to 
maintain their interest in the product. The nine-arguments condition 
of Petty and Cacioppo's (1984) experiment, which produced a large 
effect size in the predicted irection, was unusual in its use of a large 
number of arguments. These arguments may have increased persuasion 
with low involvement (because the large number of arguments func- 
tioned as a persuasion-inducing peripheral cue) and decreased it with 
high involvement (because the large amount of weak argumentation 
was processed via the central route). 
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Table 6 
Tests of Argument-Strength and Message-Length Continuous Models 
for Outcome-Relevant Involvement S udies 
Simple linear Multiple Multiple 
regression regression A regression B" 










SE of estimate 
Q~ 
0.11" .37 0.11" .37 








Note. Models are weighted least squares regressions calculated with weights equal to the reciprocal of the 
variance for each effect size. In each multiple regression model, the predictors were entered simultaneously; 
b = unstandardized regression coeflieient; b* = standardized regression coefficient. Effect sizes are positive 
for differences in the high-involvement direction and negative for differences in the low-involvement direc- 
tion; n = 36. 
"Regression equation was d = 0.091 - 0.042 (Argument strength) - 0.016 (Research group) + 0.345 
(Group × Strength), where argument strength as been adjusted (see Footnote b); when this model was 
assessed without he adjustment, the equation was 0.435 - 0.042 (Argument strength) - 2.836 (Research 
group) + 0.345 (Group × Strength). 
b This term was represented asthe study strength rating minus the mean strength rating for the outcome- 
relevant class, in order to remove xtreme multicollinearity among the predictors in Multiple Regression B 
(see Cohen & Cohen, 1983). 
c 1 = Ohio State University researchers; 0 = other esearchers. 
d Significance indicates model not correctly specified. 
* p < .001. 
guments may be viewed as somewhat unlikely. Thus, if out- 
come-relevant involvement increases recipients' motivation to 
process information about the issue discussed in a message, 
with strong arguments the thorough processing that results may 
indeed provide recipients with sufficient justification for revis- 
ing their stand on the issue. In contrast, weak arguments may 
provide a less definitive guide for involved recipients' attitudi- 
nal positions, especially in view of people's demonstrated 
Table 7 
Tests of Research-Group Categorical Model for Outcome-Relevant Involvement 
Studies for Each Condition of Argument Strength 
95% CI for di+ Homogeneity 
Between-classes Mean weighted within each 
Variable and class effect (QB ) n effect size (di÷) Lower Upper class (Qwi)" 
Strong arguments 
Research group 12.46 ** 
Ohio State 10 0.56 0.38 0.73 10.06 
Other 9 0.14 -0.02 0.29 15.96" 
Weak arguments 
Research group 21.38"* 
Ohio State 11 -0.58 -0.76 -0.39 32.68"* 
Other 6 0.01 -0.16 0.18 9.48 
Note. Effect sizes are positive for differences in the high-involvement direction and negative for differences 
in the low-involvement direction. CI = confidence interval. 
"Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity. 
*p < .05. **p < .001. 
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difficulty in processing negative information (e.g., Newman, 
Wolff, & Hearst, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This reasoning 
implies that weak arguments are analogous to the disconfirma- 
tions of hypotheses that have been shown to be difficult to pro- 
tess. This analogy is supported by the tendency for weak argu- 
ments to be more poorly recalled than strong arguments, a 
finding sometimes reported in persuasion studies (e.g., Homer, 
1987; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Therefore, if in- 
volved recipients' thorough processing of weak argumentation 
provides an insufficient basis for revising their position on the 
issue, they may reserve judgment and react no differently than 
the less-involved recipients, who presumably processed the ar- 
guments less thoroughly. Involved recipients may await or seek 
more definitive information (see Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly's 
[in press] discussion of the sufficiency principle). This logic 
would predict little or no effect of involvement with weak argu- 
mentation and a positive ffect with strong argumentation. 
Another limitation of outcome-relevant i volvement s udies 
is a lack of variety in manipulations ofthis variable. In contrast 
to the array of methods for varying involvement in the value- 
relevant studies, outcome-relevant involvement has been varied 
only by making salient o high-involvement subjects (but not to 
low-involvement subjects) that their ability to attain their per- 
sonal goals might be affected if the policy change advocated in 
the message were instituted. In most of the studies, the message 
advocated a change in university policy, which was said to take 
effect at the subject's own (vs. a distant) university or take effect 
soon (vs. in the remote future). In the studies in which the per- 
suasive message was an advertisement (Homer, 1987; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981b, Study 2; Petty et al., 1983), the advertised 
product was described as soon available in the subjects' city (vs. 
elsewhere), and in two of these studies, subjects also could (vs. 
could not) acquire the product hrough their participation in 
the experiment. The fact that persuasion researchers have de- 
vised so few methods for linking subjects' attitudes to their cur- 
rent goals or outcomes raises questions about how confidently 
we should claim that outcome-relevant involvement would gen- 
erally have the impact hat has been observed in the available 
studies. 
Another possible restriction of the generalizability offindings 
on outcome-relevant involvement s ems from the use of college 
issues in 16 of the 20 studies and the use of a single college issue, 
comprehensive exams for college students, in 11 of these 16 
studies. Three of the remaining studies presented advertise- 
ments about consumer products, and only one study used a so- 
cial policy issue (Axsom et al., 1987). Because of this focus on 
college issues, it remains an open question whether outcome- 
relevant involvement would have similar impact for issues in 
other domains. 24 
Yet another limitation to the generalizability of our findings 
for outcome-relevant studies tems from the fact that involve- 
ment was often crossed with another variable (e.g., a communi- 
cator characteristic) in addition to the quality or number of the 
arguments in the messages. By aggregating the data over these 
other variables, we reduced some of the variability potentially 
present in the effect sizes. Although our strategy is defensible 
given the relatively small number of studies available and the 
variety of other variables we encountered, future reviewers 
might be able to explore more fully how involvement may inter- 
act with contextual features of persuasion settings. 
Impression-Relevant Involvement 
Subjects whose involvement s emmed from the anticipation 
of public scrutiny of their positions were expected to maintain 
relatively neutral and defensible positions, even in response to 
especially strong or weak argumentation. The weak tendency 
for subjects who expected such scrutiny to be less persuaded 
than subjects who had no such expectation may reflect his de- 
sire to maintain a neutral, nonpolarized position. More corn- 
pelting is our finding that this slight resistance to persuasion was 
not weakened by strong arguments. Indeed, it is this finding that 
differentiates impression-relevant i volvement from outcome- 
relevant involvement. Yet because the impression-relevant 
class consisted of only five studies, conclusions about his class 
are especially tentative. However, confidence that these two 
types of involvement affect persuasion somewhat differently is 
greater than it would ordinarily be on the basis of five studies 
because one of these studies, Leippe and Elkin (1987), manipu- 
lated both outcome-relevant and impression-relevant i volve- 
ment in the same experiment and obtained evidence of the 
differing effects they (and we) postulated. Yet Neises's (1988) 
experiment, which also manipulated these two types of involve- 
ment, obtained less distinct effects. 
Another eason to be cautious about predicting the effects of 
impression-relevant i volvement is that research on anticipa- 
tory attitude change (see review by Cialdini & Petty, 1981) sug- 
gests that manipulations that are superficially similar to those 
that we have labeled impression-relevant involvement may pro- 
duce quite different effects on attitudes. For example, Cialdini 
et al. (1973) showed that merely expecting to listen to someone 
give an opinion is not sufficient to produce attitudinal modera- 
tion, which we argued may underlie the tendency for involved 
subjects not to react differentially to weak and strong argu- 
ments. Also, the research of Cialdini and his colleagues as well 
as other investigators (e.g., Hass, 1975) suggests hat letting peo- 
ple know the position of a discussion partner or communicator 
to some extent produces anticipatory conformity to that posi- 
tion rather than moderation. Furthermore, as Cialdini et al. 
(1976) demonstrated, attitudinal moderation does not occur in 
response to an anticipated discussion when the issue itself elicits 
other types of involvement or when the anticipated iscussion 
is not expected to occur elatively soon. Most importantly, these 
same studies have shown that canceling an anticipated iscus- 
sion or communication causes attitudes to "snap back" to ap- 
24 Another concern in evaluating manipulations ofoutcome-relevant 
involvement is whether these manipulations may have confounded in- 
volvement with subjects' premessage attitudes. Thus, because of self- 
interest considerations, subjects who learned that a counterattitudinal 
policy change might be introduced at their own university may well have 
formed more negative attitudes toward the policy change than subjects 
who learned that this same policy change might be introduced at an- 
other university. Although the hypothesis that he involvement manipu- 
lation affects premessage attitudes was examined and not confirmed in 
one study (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981), this test was based on 
only 18 subjects and thus had low power to reject he null hypothesis. 
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proximately their prior level, suggesting that anticipatory shifts 
represent self-presentational accommodation to situational 
pressures rather than internalized attitude change. In fact, 
Neises's (1988) finding in his "temporary response involve- 
ment" condition that the tendency for impression-relevant in- 
volvement to decrease persuasion was nullified by the cancella- 
tion of the anticipated discussion suggests that this type of in- 
volvement may have only a superficial effect on persuasion. 
In view of the complexity of findings in this related literature 
on anticipatory attitude change, we maintain that having sub- 
jeers think that their attitudes will be under scrutiny can arouse 
a variety of motives that have differing kinds of impact on the 
attitudes they present to an evaluative audience. Nonetheless, 
only one variant of this family of manipulations has been fea- 
tured in the impression-relevant studies included in this meta- 
analysis, namely, the anticipation of revealing one's attitude on 
a topic low in value-releVant involvement toan evaluative audi- 
ence whose attitudes are unknown. We assert that hese particu- 
lar circumstances cause subjects to be primarily concerned 
about he impression this attitude will make on the audience. 
Confounding Between Study Attributes and the Three 
Types of Involvement 
Because the experiments on value-relevant and outcome-rel- 
evant involvement were carried out within different theoretical 
frameworks and were intended to produce quite different attitu- 
dinal effects, it is not surprising that they are methodologically 
somewhat different. Yet the resulting confounding of type of 
involvement with attributes of the studies is a barrier to unam- 
biguous interpretation f our recta-analytic f ndings. Of partic- 
ular concern is our demonstration (see Table 1) that subjects 
were more knowledgeable onissues used in value-relevant stud- 
ies than they were on the issues used in outcome-relevant stud- 
ies and the correlated finding that the value-relevant studies 
used social policy issues, whereas the outcome-relevant studies 
typically used college issues. Because of the correlational nature 
of meta-analysis, wecannot resolve whether the differing effects 
on persuasion demonstrated bythis meta-analysis result from 
the type of involvement activated or from differences in knowl- 
edgeability and type of issue. We suggest that this matter be ad- 
dressed in primary research. 
The correlation in our meta-analytic data between type of 
involvement and the two study characteristics of knowledge- 
ability and type of issue may reflect a confound that exists in 
natural settings. People's values are ordinarily at stake only 
when they are knowledgeable about an issue and often when 
the issue pertains to a current social policy debate on which 
important reference groups have taken stands. Consequently, 
researchers working in the social judgment-involvement tradi- 
tion may well have considered correlations of involvement with 
knowledgeability (and with other variables) as part of the phe- 
nomenon rather than as an undesirable confound. In contrast, 
investigators of outcome-relevant i volvement have main- 
rained a more strictly motivational definition of involvement 
and have regarded correlations of involvement with cognitive 
variables such as knowledgeability as an undesirable confound. 
The issues chosen by these investigators seem carefully selected 
to avoid activation of subjects' values, a tactic that wisely pre- 
vents arousing value-relevant i volvement in studies oriented 
to understanding outcome-relevant involvement. However, out- 
come-relevant i volvement may well not have the effects hown 
in this meta-analysis when subjects are knowledgeable about 
issues or when these issues link to their reference groups or val- 
ues. We suspect that the outcome-relevant effects that investiga- 
tors have obtained would be overwhelmed by the attitude-de- 
fensive processes that are elicited by persuasive communica- 
tions that impinge on people's core values (see next section). 
Therefore, the effects of outcome-relevant i volvement (and 
impression-relevant involvement as well) may essentially be 
limited to situations in which attitudes are formed rather than 
changed. Under such circumstances, subjects may in fact have 
to indicate their attitudes on a premessage questionnaire but in 
fact have a prior attitude only to a minimal extent, apsychologi- 
cal state that Converse (1970) has termed anonattitude. 
Psychological Processes Mediating Effects of 
Involvement 
Our meta-analytic f ndings are not directly informative con- 
cerning the psychological processes underlying subjects' attitu- 
dinal responses. Nevertheless, the findings are worthy of discus- 
sion 'in terms of process issues, in the context of the differing 
ways that he authors of the studies have dealt with process. Not 
surprisingly, the authors of the value-relevant and outcome-rel- 
evant studies discussed the processes that mediate attitude 
change in very different erms because they conducted these 
studies in different periods and under the influence of different 
theoretical frameworks. In the social judgment-involvement 
approach, recipients' perception of the communicator's posi- 
tion was presumed to mediate persuasion (see C. W. Sherif et 
al., 1965; M. Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Recipients were as- 
sumed to displace such positions perceptually by assimilating 
positions that were relatively similar to their own attitude and 
by contrasting positions that were relatively different. In addi- 
tion, message recipients were presumed to interpret message 
content in a biased fashion, by judging messages that were sim- 
ilar to their own attitude as fair and objective and by judging 
messages that were different from their own attitude as unfair 
and propagandistic. Although assimilation and contrast as well 
as biased evaluation of message content could lessen pressure 
to change toward messages, the exact relation between these re. 
actions and attitude change remained somewhat mbiguous in
social judgment-involvement theory (see Kiesler, Collins, & 
Miller, 1969), and few of the value-relevant studies in our sam- 
ple assessed these reactions or examined their potential media- 
tional role in relation to persuasion. 
The experiments on outcome-relevant i volvement, con- 
ducted more recently mainly within the cognitive response and 
elaboration likelihood frameworks, usually assessed the cogni- 
tive responses that are presumed to mediate persuasion, Indeed, 
several studies demonstrated that subjects' cognitive responses 
(i.e., their issue- and message-relevant thoughts) were more fa- 
vorable with strong than with weak argumentation a d that the 
tendency to think favorably with strong arguments and unfavor- 
ably with weak arguments was enhanced by outcome-relevant 
involvement (e.g., Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1979b, 1984). These trends uggest that with outcome-relevant 
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involvement, information processing is relatively unbiased and 
open minded: The cogency of strong arguments and the flaws 
of weak arguments may become more apparent as message re- 
cipients devote more cognitive resources to processing message 
content. 
Because subjects in the value-relevant studies were less per- 
suaded to the extent hat they were involved (even when they 
received very strong arguments), they must have engaged in rel- 
atively closed-minded processing that enabled them to defend 
their initial attitudes. Yet, consistent with Petty and Caeioppo's 
(1986a, 1986b) speculation that high-quality argumentation 
may limit this tendency to think about he message in a biased 
manner, our meta-analysis found that value-relevant involve- 
ment's negative ffect on persuasion weakened as the strength 
of argumentation i creased. Nonetheless, it is important for 
persuasion researchers to clarify the nature of those processes 
that message recipients deploy primarily to defend their initial 
attitudes. Although little attention has been given to the details 
of biased processing of this sort, an increase in interest can be 
detected in some recent discussions ( ee Chaiken et al., in press; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b). 25 
Relatively little is known about the cognitive processing un- 
derlying recipients' attitudinal responses when they are in- 
volved on an impression-relevant basis. Yet, to probe these me- 
diational issues, Leippe and Elkin (1987) examined message re- 
cipients' thoughts and their private behavior (i.e., responses to a 
voluntary essay-writing task) related to their attitudes. Findings 
were complex and suggested that the effects of impression-rele- 
vant involvement on attitudes may have been mediated by (a) 
compliance with self-presentational demands, (b) cognitive re- 
sponses biased toward moderation and possibly toward gaining 
information rather than evaluating message validity, or both 
(see also Neises's, 1988, and Shechter's, 1987/1988, discussions 
of these issues). 
Related Analyses 
In providing an account of some of the motivations underly- 
ing attitude change, our analysis of the involvement construct 
in persuasion research elps fill a void that has developed in 
contemporary treatments of persuasion, which have empha- 
sized cognition considerably more than motivation (see Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1984). To the extent hat there is an assumption 
about motivation in modern persuasion theories, this assump- 
tion appears to be that recipients are motivated to process infor- 
mation in a relatively unbiased way to attain valid opinions that 
are in line with the relevant facts. However, in very recent years, 
more recognition that recipients are often otherwise motivated 
has begun to emerge once again in discussions of attitude 
change. In addition to the possibility of biased processing that 
follows from recipients' desire to maintain their existing atti- 
tudes (Chalken et al., in press; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 
1986b), various attitude researchers have explored attitudinal 
constructs (e.g., conviction, centrality, importance) with moti- 
vational implications (see Abelson, 1988; Judd & Krosnick, 
1982; Krosnick, 1988; Raden, 1985). 
Exploring the motivational sources of persuasion and other 
social behaviors in some detail, A. G. Greenwald (1982) pro- 
vided an analysis of the ego-involvement construct that resem- 
bles our own analysis to some extent. Greenwald noted three 
major meanings that social psychologists have ascribed to in- 
volvement, namely, concern about evaluation by others, con- 
cern about self-evaluation, and concern about maintaining 
one's values. This analysis is much broader than our own be- 
cause these types were intended to represent social psycholo- 
gists' uses of involvement and a variety of other constructs (e.g., 
evaluation apprehension, dissonance arousal, pubfic and pri- 
vate self-consciousness). Still, application of Greenwald's anal- 
ysis to the specifics of research on persuasion suggests that his 
concepts of concern about value maintenance and concern 
about evaluation by others encompass the operational defini- 
tions of involvement that we have labeled value relevant and 
impression relevant, respectively. Greenwald's third type, con- 
cern about self-evaluation, has not been examined as a form of 
involvement in persuasion research. Finally, although outcome- 
relevant involvement, he type of involvement most common 
in persuasion research of the 1980s, did not appear in Green- 
wald's analysis, he presented his framework as an open-ended 
system compatible with the addition of other types. 
Our analysis in terms of value-relevant, outcome-relevant, 
and impression-relevant involvement is also related to the func- 
tional analyses of attitudes proposed by Katz (1960) and Smith, 
Bruner, and White (1956). According to these functional theo- 
rists, attitudes erve various functions in the personality and 
thus have different motivational bases. Because involvement is
a motivational construct in attitude-change research, the match 
to these constructs i reasonably exact. Thus, our construct of 
value-relevant involvement corresponds to Katz's value-ex- 
pressive function, which recognizes that people are motivated 
to maintain their values. Our construct of outcome-relevant in- 
volvement corresponds to Katz's instrumental or utilitarian 
function, which recognizes that people are motivated to attain 
goals they regard as rewarding. Our construct of impression- 
relevant involvement corresponds most closely to Smith et al.'s 
social-adjustive function, which recognizes that people are mo- 
tivated to maintain positive relationships with other people. 
Showing the renewed importance that such functional concepts 
have gained in recent research on attitudes, both Herek (1986) 
and Prentice (1987) emphasized that attitudes have both instru- 
mental functions, by which they directly express benefits and 
25 We acknowledge that the elaboration likelihood model's biased 
processing postulate ( .g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b, p. 163) provides a
potential means for reducing value-relevant and outcome-relevant in- 
volvement to a single construct, if the effects of value-relevant i volve- 
ment hat we have documented are ascribed to biased processing stem- 
ruing from knowledge, prior attitudes, and other extraneous variables. 
Indeed, other ways of combining our three types of involvement have 
been suggested to us. Yet we prefer to maintain our distinction betw~n 
three qualitatively different types of involvement because we haw lo- 
cated three distinct bodies of research that reflect hree different ways 
that researchers have thought about involvement. Combinations oftwo 
or more of these research traditions in terms of a tingle construct are 
entirely premature because they would require accepting untested as- 
sumptions about underlying processes. Although we favor the idea that 
the three clusters of studies produced ifferent persuasion findings be- 
cause they operationalized qualitatively different types of involvement, 
our views remain provisional nd could be modified by relevant pri- 
mary research. 
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costs, and expressive or symbolic functions, by which they ex- 
press personal values and core aspects of self-identity. These 
concepts reflect he earlier functional distinctions of Katz and 
ofSmith et al. and are in harmony with our distinction between 
outcome-relevant d value-relevant i volvement. 
Both A. G. Greenwald's (1982) ego-task analysis and the ear- 
lier functional analyses of Katz (1960) and Smith et al. (1956) 
represent efforts to develop motivational constructs adequate 
for representing the variety of motives that commonly underlie 
social behavior in general and reactions in social influence set- 
tings more specifically. As we have shown for persuasion re- 
search, these motivational distinctions are essential for under- 
standing the differing ways in which persuasive communica- 
tions affect attitudes. 
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